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The Impact of Merger and Acquisition on Canadian Energy Firms 
By Zou Yingyi 
This study is trying to answer the question M&A can create value for Canadian 
energy firms or destroy value for them. It uses 37 acquiring firms in 2010 and 42 
acquiring firms in 2011 in order to find the relationship between merger and 
acquisition (M&A) and post-acquisition performance of Canadian energy firms to 
make a reasonable conclusion whether market reaction to M&A is good or bad. In the 
thesis, the market model and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) are used. From the 
output, there exists evidence of statistically significant abnormal returns. It shows 
higher trading volume during the event window as well.  
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1.1 Merger and Acquisitions (M&A’s) 
Nowadays, more and more companies are engaging in merger and acquisition 
transactions throughout the world. The Daimler-Chrysler, merger in 1998, was 
regarded as the largest industrial merger in the twentieth century. And in 2006, the 
French telecoms giant Alcatel made a bid for its US rival Lucent Technologies and 
acquired it. In 2005, eBay Inc., which is a leader in the e-commerce auction industry, 
spent $2.6 billion in acquiring the Internet-based communications company Skype 
Technologies.  
 
The definition of merger and acquisition (M&A) is the combination of two firms. In 
other words, one company buys another company in order to become more 
competitive in the market. Although merger and acquisitions have a similar meaning, 
there is a slight difference between them. A merger is a consolidation of two 
companies usually to establish a new company. However, an acquisition, which may 
be contested, is one company that purchases another company and no new company is 
established after the deal. Some companies prefer a cash transaction. Others choose 
stock shares to complete the deal.  
 
The Harvard Business Review on Mergers and Acquisitions (2001) explains the 
difference between cash transaction and stock transaction. It states that the role of two 
parties, seller and buyer, in a M&A is clear if it is a cash transaction. The ownership 
in cash transaction is clear as well. However, if it is a stock shares transaction, it is 
hard for us to distinguish who is the acquirer and who is the target company. In 
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addition, the acquiring firms will bear more risks if they choose a cash transaction. In 
stock transaction, both the acquiring firms and the target firms share the risks.  
 
M&A include three types: horizontal merger, vertical merger and conglomerate M&A. 
A horizontal merger refers to one firm acquiring another firm in the same industry in 
order to increase market share, lower costs, exploit new opportunities and so on. In 
this way, the acquiring firm obtains more market share and power. For example, in 
2002, Easyjet paid£374 million to acquire Go Fly. As a result, it has become Europe’s 
largest low-cost airline by combining two similar firms.  
 
A vertical merger is usually between two companies, that conduct business with each 
other, but they are not in the same industry. The acquiring company wants to expand 
its business operations to obtain more profits. In the 1970s and 1980s, companies such 
as Shell and BP, engaged in exploration and extraction of crude oil, decided to acquire 
downstream refineries and distribution networks. This is a typical example of vertical 
M&A.  
 
Conglomerate M&A’s, are different from horizontal and vertical M&A’s. They 
generally happen between two unrelated companies. The objective of this kind of 
M&A is to realize capital investment diversification and lower operating risks. 
 
M&A’s have their own advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, an acquiring 
firm can easily get access to new resources and expand business through a M&A. 
Also, a M&A can cause a higher industry entry barrier, which provides acquiring 
firms more control in this industry. One the other hand, disadvantages exist in the 
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process of a M&A. For instance, acquiring firms usually pay more than expected. 
Post-M&A can also create potential problems in human resources due to different 
corporate cultures.  
 
One firm chooses to acquire another firm for three main motives. 
(1) Market power: firms desire to increase their market power by eliminating 
competitors, improving efficiencies and adding new business capabilities or 
technology (Bower, 2001; Hayward, 2002) 
(2) Economies of scale and scope: a M&A can lower financing costs, such as flotation 
costs for issuing bond and shares, and operating costs, such as research development 
(R&D), meanwhile, it can increase the efficiencies of the firms, including increasing 
market distribution and strengthening productive capability. 
(3) Synergy: a M&A can create opportunity for managerial specialization. Emanuel et 
al (2011) assert that a synergy effect comes one firm acquires another firm, it expects 
to perform better than the previous two firms did before, 2+2=5. It results in a “win-
win” situation. 
 
Whether a M&A can create value for the firm is still a debate in the academic 
literature. Some arguments support that M&A’s do create value for the firms. For 
example, Weston et al (2004) argue that synergies can be created after a M&A, which 
can bring more benefits and opportunities to acquiring firms. However, others point 
out that M&A’s can create some problems and destroy the value of the firm. Jensen 
(1986) states that M&A can cause agency problem, as a result, firms make less return. 
Because the answer to this question is not clear, it is meaningful for us to undertake 
further research on mergers and acquisitions. 
4	  
	  
1.2 Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX)  
The Toronto Stock Exchange (abbreviated TSX), located in Toronto, is the third 
largest stock exchange in North America. According to the total value of market 
capitalization, TSX can be ranked the eighth largest stock exchange in the world. It 
provides a liquid trading environment and convenient investing market. Also, it has 
been a well-regulated secondary market for a century and a half. Trading mining, oil 
and gas stocks account for a higher percentage in the TSX than any other stock 
exchange in the world. Besides trading conventional securities, it lists various 
exchange traded funds, income trusts, investment funds, and split share corporations. 
The market currently is exposed to 4,000 companies with total market capitalization 
of more than $2 trillion. TSX has six basic sectors: mining, energy, clean technology, 
life sciences, technology and diversified industries. TSX has the expertise to assist 
helping companies go public. In addition, it is always innovating, for example, it has 
recently added a science sector. 
 
1.3 NGX Canadian Natural Gas Index 
Given the focus of this project on energy firms, I use the NGX Canadian Natural Gas 
Index as a market index in the database. It is known that NGX is the Canadian leading 
energy exchange. The NGX index began on December 19, 2007and the initial 
benchmark value of the index was set at 1000. Actually, it is a commodity index 
because natural gas is traded on the NGX. The NGX index is denominated in 
Canadian dollars and is calculated on a daily basis. It follows the performance of 
Alberta's ‘One-month spot’ physical market price. In addition, the index is an excess 
return index (Rm-Rf) and the investment interval is one month.  
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Energy Market at a Glance (Table 1.1) 
Sources: http://www.tmx.com/en/listings/sector_profiles/energy.html 
 
1.4 Energy Industry in Canada 
Canada is a country which is enriched with energy. Therefore, this industry plays an 
important role in the Canadian economy. This sector involves crude oil and petroleum 
products, natural gas and electricity. 
 
In 2010, the energy industry accounted for 6.7 percent of Canada’s GDP that is the 
same as year 2009. The key statistics on energy are as presented in Table 1.2. It shows 
that the energy industry in Canada is growing at an increasing rate. For example, from 
the perspective of annual energy export revenues, the difference between 2009 and 
2010 is positive $13 billion. In addition, energy companies in Canada can be divided 






June 2012 TSX Venture (TSXV) TSX 
Number of Issuers 285 121 
QMV (C$) 10,193,228,890 327,254,350,236 
New Listings 12 - 
Equity Capital Raised (C$) 900,555,117 2,634,814,386 
Number of Financings 135 39 
Volume Traded 6,619,094,608 8,534,947,334 
Value Traded (C$) 11,157,900,855 124,708,000,000 
# of Trades 1,786,013 22,118,860 
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Energy Statistics for Canada, 2009-2010 (Table 1.2) 
 
 2009 2010 Difference, 2009-
2010 
The energy industry's direct 
contribution to GDP (per cent) 
6.7 6.7 0 
Annual energy export revenues 
(Billion $) 
81 94 +13 
The energy industry's direct 
contribution to export revenues 
(per cent) 
22.0 23.2 +1.2 
Monthly Average Oil Price 
(US$/bbl) 
61.95 79.48 +17.53 
Sources: Statistics Canada, Energy Information Administration 
 
In the paper, I focus on Canadian energy firms for two reasons.  First, the energy 
industry is global in nature and engages in M&A activity extensively.  Hence, studies 
on the energy industry have worldwide applicability.  Second, the energy industry is 
different from other industries because of its products associated with energy 
resources. There is an inherent incentive for a company to use M&A activity to 
expand its business and make huge profits.  A finding of abnormal short-term returns 
might be expected given the higher returns needed to offset higher risks.  Similarly, 
studies of enhanced post-M&A efficiency and accounting effects would seem to 
reflect the synergies claimed in the explanations by companies engaging in M&A 
transactions.  
 
1.5 Organization of the Study 
In Chapter 2, we are going to review the concept of the efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH). Also, cover some previous academic studies on mergers and acquisitions. In 
Chapter 3, the methodology, including Market Model, Average Abnormal Return 
Model (AAR) and Cumulative Abnormal Return Model (CAR), will be introduced in 
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detail. We analyze the results from the empirical testing in Chapter 4 and make the 




























2.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
The idea of efficient market hypothesis (EMH) was introduced by Fama in the 1960’s. 
In a more recent article, Fama (1976) argues that the price of a security is fairly priced 
in the stock market, because the information is fully reflected on it. In other words, all 
the information has already been reflected on the stock prices, which means no one 
can earn abnormal returns in the stock market if the market is efficient. On the other 
hand, people can get access to the information without efforts. Information is widely, 
readily and available to everyone. The stock prices follow a random walk pattern. No 
one can predict the future stock prices based on historical prices or patterns under the 
efficient market hypothesis. There are three forms associated with EMH. They are 
weak form, semi-strong form and strong form. 
 
Weak form indicates that all the market data, including trading prices and trading 
volumes, have already been reflected in the stock prices. Technical analysis is useless 
under weak form EMH. A lot of previous studies on weak form test show the stock 
prices do not follow random walk and the abnormal return can be earned. For example 
Asma (2000) investigated the Dhaka stock market and found that the share return 
series do not follow a random walk model and the weak-form EMH is rejected. 
Francesco et al(2010)tested the EMH for Central and Eastern Europe equity markets 
from 1999 to 2009. The evidence showed that some markets are not weak form 
efficient. Kashif et al (2010) performed research on Asia-Pacific markets. They 
concluded that investors can earn abnormal returns and benefit from arbitrage across 
different capital markets. 
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Semi-strong form states that all the public information has already been reflected in 
the stock prices. Fundamental analysis is useless under semi-strong form EMH. The 
event study methodology can be used to test this by macro and micro events. Macro-
events refer to economic policies and condition. For example, monetary policy, fiscal 
policy, financial crisis, wars and so on. Micro-events refer to firm specific events, 
consisting of dividend announcements, stock splits, new products announcement, 
news of change in CEO, etc. Tobias (2011) tested the semi-strong form of efficiency 
at the Nairobi Stock Exchange using dividend announcement and firm value. Hussin 
et al (2011) listed 120 companies to study the announcement effect of both dividend 
and earnings on stock prices to determine the semi-strong form in the Malaysian Stock 
Exchange. Their test showed there is a positive abnormal return after dividend and 
earnings increasing announcements. But there is a negative abnormal return after 
dividend and earnings decreasing announcements. 
 
The strong form states that all the information, including inside information, has 
already been reflected in the stock prices. This means that no one can earn an excess 
return regardless of insiders and outsiders under the strong form EMH. If the insider 
can make an abnormal return, we can conclude that the strong form market efficiency 
does not exist. For instance, Khan and Ikram (2011) did the research on the Indian 
Capital Market to test strong form market efficiency by examining the performance of 
mutual funds. The results suggest that the mutual funds outperform the market. 
Therefore, the strong form market efficiency does not exist in the Indian capital 
market. 
 
2.2 Event Studies on M&A’s 
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In the recent financial literature, most empirical analysis of M&A’s is based on event 
studies. These previous studies can be divided into four categories based on their 
results and conclusions. First, some studies make the conclusion that significant 
positive abnormal returns can be earned after a M&A announcement. Second, the 
result of significant negative abnormal return is obvious in some papers. Third, some 
studies focus on the relationship between firm size and M&A. It reflects the smaller 
size of the firm, the more profits it makes after M&A. Finally, there is no clear 
conclusion in some of the articles.    
 
The evidence on some studies indicates that acquiring firms attain significant positive 
returns from M&A. For example, Jensen and Ruback (1983) report the acquiring 
firms can earn a 30 percent target return in tender offers and a 20 percent target return 
in mergers. Likewise, Baldwin and Gorecki (1987) find a big increase in productivity 
efficiency after takeovers when they analyze the relationship between M&A and 
productivity, choosing the Canadian manufacturing sector from 1971 to 1979. Also, 
Healy et al (1992) examine50 of the largest U.S. M&A during 1979 and mid-1984 and 
note that compared to the industrial average, the acquiring firms significantly improve 
their asset productivity, as a result, they are associated with higher operating cash flow 
(OCF) returns after M&A. 
 
However, some studies show that a negative return exists for the acquiring firm after a 
M&A. For instance, Andre et al (2004) choose a sample of 267 Canadian mergers and 
acquisitions for 1980-2000, using different calendar-time approaches, including and 
excluding overlapping cases. The results show that Canadian acquirers have obtained 
significant negative returns over the three-years after a M&A. Loughran and Vijh 
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(1997) studied 947 acquisitions during 1970-1989. They suggest that the targeted 
firms with stock transaction earn significantly negative excess returns of negative 25.0 
percent. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) studied the manufacturing sector in the U.S. 
from 1957 to 1977 and conclude that the profitability of targeted firms decreased 
sharply after a M&A. 
 
On the other hand, evidence for some studies of the returns to acquiring firms is based 
on firm size. Sara et al (2003) investigate 12023 acquisitions by public firms from 
1980 to 2001. They state that the announcement return for acquiring firm shareholders 
is roughly two percentage points higher for small acquirers irrespective of the form of 
financing and it does not matter whether the targeted firm is public or private.  
 
It is not clear if M&A do good to the long-term performance of acquiring firms or not. 
And the existing evidence is confusing. Franks et al (1991) find no evidence of 
significant abnormal returns over a three-year period after a M&A. Agrawal et al 
(1992) find that acquisitions are associated with insignificant abnormal returns, but 
significant abnormal returns of negative 10 percent over a five-year period after 
mergers. 
 
Previous studies have focused on the determinants of M&A’s with empirical studies 
on the difference between cash transaction and stock transaction and the relationship 
between specific events and M&A’s. Nevertheless, this paper is going to study the 






3.1 Data Description 
There are four datasets in the sample, including company list, daily stock price list, 
daily volume list and daily index list. On the company list, it covers 37 M&A 
Canadian energy firms in 2010 and 42 M&A Canadian energy firms in 2011. What’s 
more, the M&A took place in May, June, July and August. The daily stock prices of 
these Canadian energy firms are also included on the daily stock price list. It involves 
daily stock prices for 2010 M&A in 2010 and daily stock prices for 2011 M&A in 
2011. However, it excludes firms with a M&A more than once. It means that if 
another M&A occurs within the estimate event window of the first M&A, this is 
identified as an over-lapping event.  
 
We perform an analysis based on a separate database, which excludes the overlapping 
events. Because the second or the third time M&A can have impact on the first time 
M&A, if it isn’t dropped, the results will be biased. I also include the daily volume of 
the companies for the period 2010 and 2011 to test the change in trading volume ex 
and post M&A. In addition, the energy index-NGX Canadian Natural Gas Index, is 




The rationale for an event study is to test market reaction to M&A’s. First, I select an 
event window of 10 days, which refers to 5 days before t=0 (M&A) and 5 days after 
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that time, where R0 stands for the return on the event window. Second, I identify 30 
days as an ex-event window and 30 days post event window. Here R-1 and R+1stand 
for returns on the ex-event window and returns on post event window respectively.  
 
I use STATA to test R0, R-1 and R+1. Firstly, I compare R0 and R-1 in order to find 
whether the M&A announcement has any impact on stock price. If R0  is bigger than 
R-1  and it is positive and statistically significant, we can conclude that a M&A 
announcement does influence changes in stock price and vice versa. Secondly, I 
compare R-1 and R+1 to test whether post-M&A can create value for Canadian energy 
firms. If R+1 is bigger than R-1 and it is significantly positive, we can conclude that the 
value of Canadian energy firms is increased after M&A transactions and vice versa. 
 
Figure 3.1 
ex event window                    event window                   post event window 
I-------------------------------------I--------------I--------------I---------------------------------I 
t=-30                                     t=-5               t=0                t=+5                                t=+30 
                 R-1                                                   R0                                     R+1 
 
I also use STATA to test change in volume before and after a M&A. The event 
window is 10 days as well, which indicates 5 days before t=0 (M&A) and 5 days after 
that time. V0 is defined as the volume during event window. I identify 30 days before 
the event window and 30 days after the event window as a post event window. V-1 and 
V+1 represent trading volume for the ex event window and post event window, 
respectively. It is rational to compare the change in trading volume before and after a 




          ex event window                    event window                   post event window 
I-------------------------------------I--------------I--------------I---------------------------------I 
t=-30                                     t=-5               t=0                t=+5                                t=+30 
                 V-1                                                   V0                                     V+1 
 
3.3 Models 
3.3.1 Market Model 
We test the semi-strong form EMH using the market model. Firstly, we have to 




-1                                                                                                   (Equation 3.1) 
where: 
Rt= return on stock during period t 
Pt= stock price during period t 
Pt-1= stock price during period t-1 
Secondly, the following formula (Equation 3.2) represents the Market Model. 
                                                                                  (Equation 3.2) 
where: 
Ri,t= return on security i during period t 
αi= intercept of the equation for security i 
βi= slope of the equation for security i 
Rm,t= return on the market during period t 
titmiiti RR ,,, ˆˆ εβα ++=
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εi,t= error term 
I use STATA to do the regression of Equation 3.2. NGX index is regarded as Rm,t. In 
addition, εi,t, the error term, stands for unsystematic risk, which is the risk for the 
specific firm. 
 
To do the simple linear regression, we have four assumptions for the error term to 
keep in mind. (see Hill et al 2011) 
The expected value of the random error e: E (e)=0 
The variance of the random error e: var (e)=σ2 
The covariance between any pair of random errors ei and ej: cov (ei, ej)=0 
The values of e are normally distributed about their mean: e～N(0, σ2) 
 
3.3.2 Abnormal Returns (AR) and Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and 
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) 
Equation 3.3 represents the Abnormal Return (AR). 
                                                                           (Equation 3.3) 
where, ARi,t indicates the abnormal return on security i during period t. Ri,t refers to 
return on security i during period t.  and  are estimated from Equation 3.2, using 
data from the appropriate estimation window. Meanwhile, Rm,t represents the NGX 
index. 
 




Σ  !"it                                                                                                                                         (Equation 3.4) 




where, N stands for the number of securities. 
A T-test can be used. Null hypothesis is stated: H0:AARt=0 (if it is true, market is 
efficient). Alternative hypothesis is stated: Ha:AARt≠0 (if it is true, market is not 
efficient).If people can get excess return after M&A announcement, we are against 
semi-strong form EMH. If not, semi-strong form EMH is supported. 
Cumulative abnormal return, Equation 3.5, explains the impact of M&A on Canadian 
energy firms. 





ΣCARit                                                                                                                                     (Equation 3.6) 
Equation 3.6 describes the Average Cumulative Abnormal Return. 
Also the T-test is used. Null hypothesis is stated: H0:ACARt=0. Alternative hypothesis 
is stated: Ha:ACARt≠0. If we accept the null hypothesis, the market is efficient. If we 
reject the null hypothesis, the market is not efficient. 
 
3.4 Data Sources 
My database covers the M&A company list for the period 2010 and 2011 with daily 
stock prices, daily trading volume and daily NGX index. I collected my database from 
the Bloomberg, TSX official website and Yahoo Finance. 
 




























Analysis of Results 
4.1 Overview 
This section is going to analyze and explain the results of the models, which derive 
from Chapter 3.37 M&A’s in 2010 and 42 M&A’s in 2011 firm list is attached in 
Appendix A. I have collected these data and run them in STATA to obtain these 
results. 
 
4.2 Stock Price 
4.2.1 Regression Analysis 
Market model (Equation 3.1) is sufficient to derive a linear relationship between beta 
and expected return. In the sample, I use NGX index as the market return. Table 4.1 is 
the output of regression of market model, which is shown as follows: 
Table 4.1 
 
From the output, it indicates that α, which is the intercept of market model, is -
0.0004239 and β, which is the slope of market model, is 0.8012253. The value of β 
measures the sensitivity of the security to the market return. The larger the value of β, 
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the more sensitive the security to the market return. The results show that a change in 
these securities is sensitive to the market change. 
 
R-squared is widely used in linear regressions.  Given a set of data points, linear 
regression gives a formula for the line most closely matching those points.  It also 
gives an R-squared value to measure how well the resulting line matches the original 
data points. The higher R-squared value means stocks are the better to match market 
model equation, which refers that the security performance patterns have been in line 
with the index. However, in the output, R-squared is 0.0104 and adjusted R-squared is 
0.0102. The values are relatively low. The movement of stocks in the sample does not 
follow the NGX index pattern. 
 
4.2.2 Average Abnormal Return (AAR) Results 
The output of average abnormal return is presented in Table 4.2. I use the daily stock 





T-test is used. Null hypothesis is stated: H0:AARt=0 (if it is true, market is efficient). 
Alternative hypothesis is stated: Ha:AARt≠0 (if it is true, market is not efficient). If P-
value is more than 0.05 (P>0.05), we do not reject null hypothesis. If P-value is less 
than 0.05 (P<0.05), we reject null hypothesis. From Table 4.2, aar stands for average 
abnormal return (AAR). P- value is 0.4830, which is bigger than 0.05. Therefore, we 
can accept the null hypothesis and conclude that the market is semi-strong efficient. 
Table 4.3 
 
Table 4.3 demonstrates the difference between aar2 (R0) and aar1 (R-1). The aar2 and 
aar1 represent average abnormal return in event window and average abnormal return 
in ex-event window, respectively. To compare aar2 (R0) and aar1 (R-1), we can find 
whether a M&A can affect stock price or not. The output above shows a slight 
difference between aar2 and aar1, which is 0.0020252. What’s more, the P-value is 
zero that is below 0.05, we reject null hypothesis that H0 : mean=0. T-value is 6.6572, 
which means there exists significant abnormal return after M&A. we can conclude 




Table 4.4  
Table 4.4 describes the relationship between aar3 (R+1) and aar1 (R-1). We compare 
aar3 (R+1) and aar1 (R-1) in order to test whether M&A’s can create Canadian energy 
firm’s value or not. From the output, we can tell the difference between R+1 and R-1 
represented by aar3_1 is 0.0004983. Although the number is not big, the T-value and 
P-value are 2.9723 and 0.0030 respectively. We can therefore reject the null 
hypothesis, H0 : mean=0. The result indicates a significant abnormal return does exist 
and M&A’s do create Canadian energy firm’s value. 
 
4.3 Volume 
I have collected the daily volume of M&A firms in order to test whether there is a 









The avg1 (V-1) and avg2 (V0) represent the average volume in ex event window and 
average volume in event window. They are 531928.5 and 863344.1, respectively. It 
shows that the average volume (V0) in the event window is much higher than average 
volume (V-1) in ex event window. On the other hand, the T-value and P-value are 
15.7125 and 0.0000, respectively. It means the difference between V0 and V-1 is 












The purpose of this paper is to find the relationship between M&A and Canadian 
energy firms. It is going to answer the question: can M&A’s create value for Canadian 
energy firms? I use daily stock price and volume for 2010 and 2011 M&A firms in the 
Canadian energy sector to perform the empirical research on this topic. 
The output of STATA shows the following results: 
(1) regression of Market Model: due to lower R-square, the securities do not track 
the movement of the NGX index.  
(2) average accumulative return (AAR):  
(i) we do not reject H0:AARt =0, which states the market is efficient. 
(ii) there exists a significant abnormal return in the event window, which 
indicates that M&A’s have impact on stock prices. 
(iii) a significant positive return exists after a M&A and we can make a 
reasonable conclusion that a M&A can create value for Canadian energy firms. 
(3) volume: the average volume in the event window is much higher than that in 
ex-event window. 
The results show that the market is efficient and stock prices follow a random walk. 
Hence, investors cannot earn abnormal return. The most important conclusion is that 
M&A’s are associated with increasing the value of the firms in the Canadian energy 
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Date	   Acquirer	  Name	   Payment	  Type	   Acquirer	  Ticker	  
10-­‐6-­‐2	   Afren	  PLC	   Stock	   AFR	  LN	  
10-­‐6-­‐10	   ARC	  Resources	  Ltd	   Cash	  and	  Stock	   ARX	  CN	  
10-­‐7-­‐2	   Atlantic	  Power	  Corp	   Cash	   ATP	  CN	  
10-­‐6-­‐16	   Birch	  Lake	  Energy	  Inc	   Stock	   BLK	  CN	  
10-­‐6-­‐1	   Colonial	  Coal	  Inter.	  Corp	   Stock	   CAD	  CN	  
10-­‐5-­‐25	   CanElson	  Drilling	  Inc	   Cash	  and	  Stock	   CDI	  CN	  
10-­‐5-­‐3	   Chinook	  Energy	  Inc	   2731593Z	  RU	  Equity	   CKE	  CN	  
10-­‐5-­‐26	   Canrock	  Energy	  Corp	   2731593Z	  RU	  Equity	   CNK	  CN	  
10-­‐7-­‐28	   Cequence	  Energy	  Ltd	   Stock	   CQE	  CN	  
10-­‐8-­‐16	   Corsa	  Coal	  Corp	   Cash	  and	  Stock	   CSO	  CN	  
10-­‐6-­‐28	   Coltstar	  Ventures	  Inc	   Stock	   CTR	  CN	  
10-­‐8-­‐9	   CommScopeInc	   Cash	   CTV	  US	  
10-­‐6-­‐7	   Emerge	  Oil	  &	  Gas	  Inc	   Cash	   EME	  CN	  
10-­‐8-­‐3	   EnQuest	  PLC	   Stock	   ENQ	  LN	  
10-­‐5-­‐17	   Enseco	  Energy	  Services	  Corp	   Cash	   ENS	  CN	  
10-­‐5-­‐14	   Gasfrac	  Energy	  Services	  Inc	   Stock	   GFS	  CN	  
10-­‐6-­‐1	   Galleria	  Opportunities	  Inc	   Cash	   GOI/H	  CN	  
10-­‐7-­‐29	   Hyperion	  Exploration	  Corp	   Cash	   HYX	  CN	  
10-­‐7-­‐21	   CUB	  Energy	  Inc	   Stock	   KUB	  CN	  
10-­‐6-­‐22	   NovaDx	  Ventures	  Corp	   Cash	  and	  Stock	   NDX	  CN	  
10-­‐7-­‐19	   Petrodorado	  Energy	  Ltd	   Stock	   PDQ	  CN	  
10-­‐5-­‐6	   PetroglobeInc	   Undisclosed	   PGB	  CN	  
10-­‐7-­‐12	   Pengrowth	  Energy	  Corp	   Stock	   PGF	  CN	  
10-­‐5-­‐10	   Paramount	  Resources	  Ltd	   Cash	   POU	  CN	  
10-­‐5-­‐31	   Ram	  Power	  Corp	   Stock	   RPG	  CN	  
10-­‐5-­‐20	   Renegade	  Petroleum	  Ltd	   Cash	   RPL	  CN	  
10-­‐6-­‐22	   Sagres	  Energy	  Inc	   Stock	   SGI	  CN	  
10-­‐6-­‐22	   Surge	  Energy	  Inc	   Stock	   SGY	  CN	  
10-­‐6-­‐30	   Saccharum	  Energy	  Corp	   Stock	   SHM	  CN	  
10-­‐5-­‐21	   Suroco	  Energy	  Inc	   Cash	  and	  Stock	   SRN	  CN	  
10-­‐6-­‐2	   Torquay	  Oil	  Corp	   Cash	  and	  Stock	   TOC/A	  CN	  
10-­‐8-­‐16	   Trioil	  Resources	  Ltd	   Cash	   TOL	  CN	  
10-­‐6-­‐21	   VeresenInc	   Cash	   VSN	  CN	  
10-­‐7-­‐20	   Western	  Energy	  Services	  Corp	   Cash	   WRG	  CN	  
10-­‐6-­‐9	   Western	  Coal	  Corp	   Stock	   WTN	  CN	  
10-­‐5-­‐26	   Yoho	  Resources	  Inc	   Cash	  or	  Stock	   YO	  CN	  




Announce	  Date	   Acquirer	  Name	   Payment	  Type	   Acquirer	  Ticker	  
11-­‐7-­‐20	   CNOOC	  Ltd	   Cash	   883	  HK	  
11-­‐6-­‐30	   Barrick	  Gold	  Corp	   Cash	   ABX	  CN	  
11-­‐6-­‐3	   Americas	  PetrogasInc	   Cash	  and	  Stock	   BOE	  CN	  
11-­‐8-­‐4	   Big	  Sky	  Petroleum	  Corp	   Stock	   BSP	  CN	  
11-­‐5-­‐26	   Cordy	  Oilfield	  Services	  Inc	   Undisclosed	   CKK	  CN	  
11-­‐5-­‐2	   Crew	  Energy	  Inc	   Stock	   CR	  CN	  
11-­‐6-­‐9	   CWC	  Well	  Services	  Corp	   Cash	   CWC	  CN	  
11-­‐5-­‐3	   Dundee	  Energy	  Ltd	   Cash	  or	  Stock	   DEN	  CN	  
11-­‐8-­‐18	   Desert	  Eagle	  Resources	  Ltd	   Undisclosed	   DER	  CN	  
11-­‐8-­‐16	   Enbridge	  Inc	   Cash	   ENB	  CN	  
11-­‐5-­‐24	   ENTREC	  Corp	   Cash	  and	  Stock	   ENT	  CN	  
11-­‐7-­‐15	   Enhanced	  Oil	  Resources	  Inc	   Cash	   EOR	  CN	  
11-­‐5-­‐31	   Essential	  Energy	  Services	  Ltd	   Cash	  and	  Stock	   ESN	  CN	  
11-­‐7-­‐28	   General	  Motors	  Co	   Cash	   GM	  US	  
11-­‐6-­‐7	   Hemisphere	  Energy	  Corp	   Cash	  and	  Stock	   HME	  CN	  
11-­‐8-­‐22	   Klondike	  Silver	  Corp	   Cash	  and	  Stock	   KS	  CN	  
11-­‐7-­‐4	   Marquee	  Petroleum	  Ltd	   Cash	   MQE	  CN	  
11-­‐5-­‐3	   Mullen	  Group	  Ltd	   Cash	  and	  Stock	   MTL	  CN	  
11-­‐7-­‐26	   Mountainview	  Energy	  Ltd	   Stock	   MVW	  CN	  
11-­‐5-­‐26	   Nordic	  Oil	  &	  Gas	  Ltd	   Cash	   NOG	  CN	  
11-­‐7-­‐18	   North	  Sea	  Energy	  Inc	   Stock	   NUK	  CN	  
11-­‐5-­‐31	   Onex	  Corp	   Cash	   OCX	  CN	  
11-­‐5-­‐3	   Pinetree	  Capital	  Ltd	   Undisclosed	   PNP	  CN	  
11-­‐7-­‐14	   Polo	  Resources	  Ltd	   Cash	   POL	  LN	  
11-­‐8-­‐5	   Pason	  Systems	  Inc	   Cash	   PSI	  CN	  
11-­‐6-­‐13	   Pure	  Technologies	  Ltd	   Cash	   PUR	  CN	  
11-­‐7-­‐11	   Provident	  Energy	  Ltd	   Cash	  and	  Stock	   PVE	  CN	  
11-­‐7-­‐8	   Questerre	  Energy	  Corp	   Cash	   QEC	  CN	  
11-­‐7-­‐5	   Shoreline	  Energy	  Corp	   Stock	   SEQ	  CN	  
11-­‐8-­‐26	   San	  Leon	  Energy	  PLC	   Cash	  or	  Stock	   SLE	  LN	  
11-­‐8-­‐18	   Sonde	  Resources	  Corp	   Cash	   SOQ	  CN	  
11-­‐5-­‐26	   Savanna	  Energy	  Services	  Corp	   Cash	  or	  Stock	   SVY	  CN	  
11-­‐5-­‐13	   Strata-­‐X	  Ltd	   Stock	   SXE	  CN	  
11-­‐7-­‐11	   Trican	  Well	  Service	  Ltd	   Undisclosed	   TCW	  CN	  
11-­‐5-­‐19	   Tuscany	  Inter.	  Drilling	  Inc	   Cash	   TID	  CN	  
11-­‐8-­‐29	   Noravena	  Capital	  Corp	   Stock	   TMV	  CN	  
11-­‐5-­‐24	   Tourmaline	  Oil	  Corp	   Stock	   TOU	  CN	  
11-­‐8-­‐3	   Petro	  Viking	  Energy	  Inc	   Cash	   VIK	  CN	  
11-­‐5-­‐11	   Westfire	  Energy	  Ltd	   Stock	   WFE	  CN	  
11-­‐7-­‐21	   Wilton	  Resources	  Inc	   Cash	  and	  Stock	   WIL	  CN	  
11-­‐6-­‐8	   Westport	  Innovations	  Inc	   Cash	  and	  Stock	   WPT	  CN	  
11-­‐7-­‐27	   Xinergy	  Ltd	   Cash	   XRG	  CN	  
